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| Calendar: | Philosophy Calendar |
| Title: | Colloquia - Ofra Magidor |
| When: | March 28 , 2013 4:30 pm - 5:30 pm |
| Location: | 3 Seminary Place, Seminar Room |
| Description: | TITLE: "The myth of the de se" ************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************ Abstract-"The myth of the de se" An increasingly popular line of thought in both philosophy and linguistics is one that I call ‘The myth of the de se’. The central line of thought that runs at the core of the myth is the something like the following: There is a special class of propositional (or ‘propositional-like’) attitudes: self-locating or de se attitudes, ones that are typically expressed using indexical expressions such as ‘I’ and ‘now’. Moreover, De se attitudes pose a special challenge for our account of propositional attitudes, requiring us to amend what would otherwise be considered adequate accounts of such attitudes. No doubt the most prominent defence of the myth appears in Lewis’s seminal paper ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, where Lewis argues that accommodating de se attitudes requires shifting from the possible-worlds account of attitudes to the centred-worlds account (though Lewis and the many contemporary adherents of the centred-world frameworks are certainly not the only defenders of the myth). My aim in this paper is to attempt to debunk the myth in general and its Lewisian version in particular. ************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************ For more information on the speaker go to: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball1646/ |
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