

## PETER D. KLEIN

### University Address

Philosophy Department  
Rutgers University  
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### Education

Earlham College, B.A. 1962  
Yale University, M.A., 1964, Ph.D. 1966

### Employment

Colgate University: Assistant Professor 1966-70  
Rutgers University: Assistant Professor 1970-1973  
Associate Professor 1973-1981  
Professor, 1981-present

### Publications

#### *Books*

Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, University of Minnesota Press, 1981, xiv + 242.  
(second printing, 1984)

Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infitism, co-edited with John Turri, Oxford University Press., 2014.

#### *Articles, Chapters in Books, Reviews and Other Items*

“The Private Language Argument and The Sense-Datum Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 47.3, 1969, 325-343.

“Are Strawson's Persons Immortal? - A Reply,” Philosophical Studies, 20.5, 1969, 65-69.

“A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 67.16, 1971, 471-482.

Reprinted in: Knowing, M. Roth & L. Galis (eds.), University Press of America, 1984; Knowledge and Justification, Ernest Sosa (ed), Ashgate Publishing Co., 1994; On Knowing and the Known, Ken Lucey (ed), Prometheus Books, 1996; Epistemology: An Anthology, J. Kim & E. Sosa & M. McGrath (eds.), Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies, 1999; Epistemology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, R. Neta (ed.), 2012.

“Knowledge, Causality and Defeasibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 73.20, 1976, 792-812.

Review of David Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, in Philosophical Review, 85.2, 1976, 225-227.

“Misleading ‘Misleading Defeaters’,” Journal of Philosophy, 76.7, 1979, 382-386.

Reprinted in On Knowing and the Known, Ken Lucey (ed.), Prometheus Books, 1996

“Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification,” Philosophical Studies, 37.1, 1980, 81-89.

“Reply to Professor Odegard,” Philosophical Books, 23.4, 1982, 198-203.

Commentary article on Keith Lehrer: Profiles, Radu Bogdan (ed.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43.3, 1983, 409-419.

“Real Knowledge,” Synthese, 55. 2, 1983, 143-164.

“Virtues of Inconsistency,” Monist, 68.1, 1985, 105-135.

“Radical Interpretation and Global Scepticism” in Truth and Interpretation, Ernest LePore (ed.), Basil Blackwell, 1986, 369-386.

“Immune Belief Systems,” Philosophical Topics, 14.1, 1986, 259-280.

“On Behalf of the Skeptic,” The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, S. Luper-Foy (ed.), Rowman & Littlefield, 1987, 267-281.

“Epistemic Compatibilism and Canonical Beliefs,” in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, M. Roth & G. Ross (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, 99-117.

“Certainty” in A Companion to Epistemology, J. Dancy & E. Sosa (eds.), Basil Blackwell, 1992, 61-64. Also in second edition, 2010, 272-274.

“Contemporary Scepticism” in A Companion to Epistemology, J. Dancy & E. Sosa (eds.), Basil Blackwell, 1992, 458-462. Also in the second edition, 2010, 715-718.

“Scepticism” in A Companion to Epistemology, J. Dancy & E. Sosa (eds.), Basil Blackwell, 1992, 457-8. Also in second edition, 2010, 714-715.

“What Price Coherence?” (with Ted Warfield), Analysis, 54.3, July 1994, 129-32.

“Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails,” Philosophical Topics, 23.1, Spring 1995, 213-236.  
Reprinted in Huemer & Audi (eds.), Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, 2002.

“Closure” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, R. Audi (ed.), 1995, 126-7.

“Certainty” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, R. Audi (ed.), 1995, 113-4.

“No Help for the Coherentist,” (with Ted Warfield) Analysis, 56.2, April 1996, 118-121.

“Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility” in Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology, Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, 97-130.

“Certainty” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, E. Craig (ed.), 1998, vol 2, 264-267.

“The Concept of Knowledge” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, E. Craig (ed.), 1998, vol 5, 266-276.  
Reprinted in The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), 2005, 524-32.

“Epistemology” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, E. Craig (ed.), 1998, vol 3, 362-365.  
Reprinted in The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), 2005, 224-7.

“Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58.4, 1998, 919-925.

“Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13, J. Tomberlin (ed.), 1999, 297-325.

Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology (ed. E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl, M. McGrath), 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Blackwell Publishing, 2008, 165-185; and in Arguing about Knowledge, R. Neta & D. Prichard (eds.), New York: Routledge, 2009, 249-272.

“Why Not Infitism?” in Epistemology: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress in Philosophy, Richard Cobb-Stevens (ed.), Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000, vol. 5, 199-208.

“Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism,” Philosophical Issues, 10, 2000, 108-116.

Also appeared in Spanish in Teorema, 19.3, 2000, 127-35.

“The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism,” Acta Analytica, 15.24, 2000, 7-24.

“Skepticism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, October, 2001, and updated September, 2005, and October, 2010. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/>

“Skepticism,” The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2002, 336-361.

“How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism” in The Sceptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Press, ed. Steven Luper, 2003, 75-94.

Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology (ed. E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl, M. McGrath), 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Blackwell Publishing, 2008, 35-50.

“Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism,” The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, Erik Olsson (ed.), Kluwer, 2003, 281-297.

“When Infinite Regresses Are *Not* Vicious,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66.3, 2003, 718-729.

“Knowledge is True, Non-defeated Justified Belief,” Essential Knowledge, Longman Publishers, Steven Luper (ed.), 2004, 124-135.

“There is No Good Reason to be an Academic Skeptic,” Essential Knowledge, Longman Publishers, Steven Luper (ed.), 2004, 299-309.

“What *IS* Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68.1, 2004, 166-171.

“Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, John Greco (ed.), Blackwell Publishers, 2004, 112-125.

“Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues, 14, 2004, 165-184.

“Is Infitism the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem?” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell Publishers, 2005, 131-40; also in 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Wiley Blackwell, 2014, 274-82.

“Reply to Ginet,” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, Blackwell Publishers, 2005, 149-52; also in 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 2014, 291-5.

“Infitism’s Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism,” in a special edition of Veritas entitled Perspectives in Contemporary Epistemology, 50.4, 2005, 153-172. Available here:

<http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/ojs/index.php/veritas/issue/view/178>

“Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning,” Philosophical Studies, 134.1, 2007, 1-17.

Translated and reprinted: “El conocimiento humano y el progreso infinito del Razonamiento,” Signos Filosoficos, 10.19, 2008, 175-204.

“How to be an Infitist about Doxastic Justification,” Philosophical Studies, 134.1, 2007, 25-29.

“Contemporary Responses to Agrippa’s Trilemma,” The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, John Greco (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2008, 484-503.

“Useful False Beliefs,” Epistemology: New Essays, Quentin Smith (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2008, 25-61.

“Self-Profile,” Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, second edition, Matthias Steup (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 156-163.

“Infitism,” Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge, 2011, 245-56.

“Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism,” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, Diego Machuca (ed.), Springer, 2011, 79-96.

“Infitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem,” Conceptions of Knowledge, Stephan Tolksdorf (ed.), de Gruyter, 2012, 487-508.

“What Makes Knowledge the Most Highly Prized Type of Belief?” The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, T. Black & K. Becker (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2012, 152-169.

“Infinetism,” The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, A. Cullison (ed.), Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, 72-91.

“Infinetism in Epistemology,” (with J. Turri), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/inf-epis/>

“Reasons, Reasoning and Knowledge: A Proposed Rapprochement between Infinetism and Foundationalism,” Ad Infinetum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinetism, P. Klein and J. Turri (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014, 105-124.

“Introduction,” with John Turri, Ad Infinetum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinetism, P. Klein and J. Turri (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014, 1-18.

“No Final End in Sight,” Current Controversies in Epistemology, R. Neta (ed), Routledge, 2014, 95-115.

“Infinetism,” Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, forthcoming.

### **Work in Progress**

Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, co-edited with Claudio de Almeida and Rodrigo Borges, under contract with Oxford University Press, anticipated publication late 2015/early 2016.

“Infinetism,” co-authored with John Turri, for the new Oxford Bibliographies Online, D. Pritchard (ed.), Oxford University Press., submitted.

“Knowing Oneself is Not an Epistemic Privilege,” paper in progress. Early versions given at UNAM on 10/21/2011 and at a conference at University of Graz, 12/2011.

“How to and How Not to Solve the Gettier Problem,” to be included in Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, co edited with Claudio de Almeida and Rodrigo Borges, under contract with Oxford University Press, see above.

### **Fellowships and Grants**

Danforth Graduate Fellowship, 1962-1966

Ford Foundation Grant, 1969-70, for study at Oxford University, Fall and Winter Term, 1969-70 (A.J.Ayer was the sponsor.)

New Jersey Commission for the Humanities, 1973-74

Control Data Corporation -- Computer Assisted Instruction in elementary logic, 1979-80  
NEH Grant from publications program to assist in publication of Certainty, 1981  
Rutgers Research Council, various small grants

### **(Some) Professional Activities**

Editorial Board: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000 – present  
Advisory Board Member, Episteme, 2012-2014  
Organizer of the Rutgers Epistemology Conference and the Young Epistemologist Prize,  
1999- 2013  
APA Eastern Division Advisory Committee to the Program Committee, 2004-7  
Member of the Eastern Division Program Committee (1998-2000)  
Subject Editor (with R. Foley) of the epistemology entries for the OnLine version  
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, E. Craig (ed.) (1998-2005)  
Subject Editor (with R. Foley) for epistemology entries for the Encyclopedia of  
Philosophy, Routledge, E. Craig (ed.) (1998-2005)  
Member of APA Committee on Lectures, Publication and Research (1995-1998)  
Invited lecturer to NEH Summer Institute on Epistemology, summer, 1993  
Executive Secretary of New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association, 1976-1987  
Participant in NEH Summer Institute, Amherst, 1972

Referee for: Minnesota Press, Harvard Press, California Press, Prentice-Hall, Oxford  
University Press, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge University Press, Philosophical Studies,  
Synthese, Nous, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,  
American Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Routledge,  
Analysis.

### **Some Recent Talks**

“Reasons, Reasoning and Knowledge: A Proposed Rapprochement between Informatism and  
Foundationalism,” Workshop on Infinite Regress, Vanderbilt (10/2013), “Knowing Thyself  
is not an Epistemic Privilege,” Plenary Speaker in the Workshop Series “Mind  
Knowledge” at the University of Graz (12/8/2011), “What Makes Knowledge the Most  
Highly Prized Type of Belief?” Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (10/2011),  
“Knowing Thyself is Not an Epistemic Privilege,” Universidad Nacional Autonoma de  
Mexico, (10/2011), “Defense of Informatism” given at Brandeis University (11/2010),  
“Cartesian Skepticism and Some Constraints on Replies” given at Universidad Nacional  
Autonoma de Mexico(11/09); “Informatism and the Epistemic Regress Problem” given at  
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (4/2009) and at the Russell V Conference,  
Bishop Ranch, CA. (3/2009); “Agrippa’s Trilemma,” (3/2008) given at Universidad  
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico; “Informatism’s Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty  
and Skepticism” given as an invited speaker for the Jowett Society Lecture, Oxford  
University (5/2006) and at the Russell II Conference, Bishop Ranch, CA. (3/2006); “The  
Gettier Problem –Forty Years Later,” invited speaker at Eastern Division APA, December  
2006; “The Gettier Problem – Forty Years Later,” Montclair State University, 9/2005;

“Useful Falsehoods,” University of Nevada, Reno (11/2004), University of Missouri, Columbia (10/2004); “How to Respond to Academic Skepticism,” Colgate Kokonis Symposium, 4/04; “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasons”, Greensboro Epistemology Conference, 3/20, U.Mass-Amherst, 3/04; “Infinitism is the Best Solution to the Regress Problem,” Bryn Mawr (9/18/02), New Jersey Regional Philosophical Association (4/13/02), University of Colorado (3/11/02); “Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism,” Pacific APA (3/01); “When Infinite Regresses Are *Not* Vicious,” Pacific APA (3/01); “The Infinite Regress of Reasons and the Extent of Our Knowledge,” keynote address for the Illinois Philosophical Association (11/00); “What Can We Know?” Acadia University (9/00); “The Failures of Dogmatism” Bled Conference(5/99), Mississippi Philosophical Association (3/99); invited paper at the World Congress of Philosophy (8/8/98) “Why Not Infinitism?”; invited paper at the SOPHIA Conference “Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism” (6/23/98); gave Brantl Lectures at Montclair State University (2/19/98); read “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons” at Brown (2/7/97), San Francisco State (3/7/97), Colgate (4/11/97), University of Iowa (10/17/97); commented on paper by Ernest Sosa (Chapel Hill Colloquium, 10/4/97); commented on three papers at Pacific APA, March, 1988; invited Symposium paper at APA, April, 1984.

### **Courses Taught**

Undergraduate: various logic courses from "applied" reasoning to metatheory of first order and epistemic logic; the range of standard introductory topics courses, history of philosophy and philosophy of science; various epistemology courses; interdisciplinary honors courses

Graduate courses: various courses in epistemology

### **University Service**

Rutgers Honors College Planning Committee, 2014 - present

New Brunswick Faculty Council, 2013-present

Acting Executive Vice Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences, 2006-2009

Chair of FAS Honors Task Force, 2004-5

Co-Chair (with Richard Miller) of University Task Force on the Curriculum, 2004-5

Appointments and Promotions Committee, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 2001-2005

Livingston College Executive Committee, 2000-2003

Search Committee for Dean of Arts and Sciences, 2000-2001

Acting Associate Dean, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 1999-2000

Department Chairperson, Livingston College (1978-81); New Brunswick (1982-1987, 1993-96, 2005-2006)

Vice Provost for Undergraduate Education & Associate Provost for Humanities/Fine Arts, 1987-1992

Chairperson of SERC Building Program Committee, 1995-96



University Senate, 1976-1979, 1980-82 (and various Senate Committees including Executive Committee)

Various Provost and University ad hoc committees

New Brunswick Council of Fellows, 1984-87

Livingston College Planning and Policy Committee, 1981-1987

Admissions Committee for Business School (New Brunswick), 1984-1987

Graduate School Humanities Committee, 1985-86

Graduate School Executive Council, 1984-1987

Rutgers Research Council, 1986-88

The usual set of department committees

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