Seminar in the Philosophy of Mind (732:575) R. Matthews Spring 2015

Seminar Description: Seminar will examine new directions in recent work on belief and belief attribution in the wake of growing disenchantment with the long dominant representational theory of mind. Seminar will focus on four general topics: (i) non-relational accounts of belief (and propositional attitudes more generally) and their compatibility with relational construals of belief attributions (with particular focus on the proper construal of attitude verb complements); (ii) neo-dispositionalist accounts of belief, with special focus on the proper construal penumbral belief states such as delusions; (iii) the role of belief attributions (and other propositional attitude attributions more generally) in our culture’s commonsense psychology; and (iv) recent proposals to the effect that there is a distinctive phenomenology of belief. Just how much time we devote to each of these topics will depend on the particular interests of seminar members.

Readings will be drawn from a wide range of philosophers of language and mind, as well as linguists, including, e.g., myself, Ryle, Davidson, Mark Richard, Eric Schwitzgebel, Tim Bayne, Friederike Moltemann, Peter Hanks, Bertram Malle, Adam Morton, Victoria McGeer, and Tad Zawidzki.