 | Peter D. Klein
Professor I |
| Education | | B.A., Earlham College; Ph.D., Yale University | | Speciality | | Epistemology | | Research | | My current research focuses on the various theories of justification -- foundationalism, coherentism and infinitism. The latter view, namely that the structure of justificatory reasons is infinite and non-repeating, has never been carefully investigated primarily because it was thought that there are obvious, sound objections to it. I do not think those objections are sound. Further, I think there are some unanswerable objections to foundationalism and coherentism. The task is to uncover the advantages and drawbacks of infinitism. | | Publications | Book- Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, University of Minnesota Press, 1981, xiv + 242. (second printing, 1984)
Articles, Chapters in Books, Reviews and Other Items - “The Private Language Argument and The Sense-Datum Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 47 (3), 1969, 325-343.
- “Are Strawson's Persons Immortal? - A Reply,” Philosophical Studies, 20 (5), 1969, 65-69.
- “A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 67 (16), 1971, 471-482.
- Reprinted in: Knowing, M. Roth & L. Galis (eds.), University Press of America, l984; Knowledge and Justification, Ernest Sosa (ed), Ashgate Publishing Co., 1994; On Knowing and the Known, Ken Lucey (ed), Prometheus Books, 1996; Epistemology: An Anthology, Kim, Sosa, McGrath (eds.), Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies, 1999.
- “Knowledge, Causality and Defeasibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 73 20), 1976, 792-812.
- Review of Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, in Philosophical Review, 85 (2), 1976, 225-227.
- “Misleading ‘Misleading Defeaters’,” Journal of Philosophy, 76 (7), 1979, 382-386.
- Reprinted in On Knowing and the Known, Ken Lucey (ed), Prometheus Books, 1996
- “Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification,” Philosophical Studies, 37, 1980, 81-89.
- “Reply to Professor Odegard,” Philosophical Books, 23 (4), 1982, 198-203.
- Commentary article on Keith Lehrer: Profiles, ed. by Radu Bogdan, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43 (3), 1983, 409-419.
- “Real Knowledge,” Synthese, 55 (2), 1983, 143-164.
- “Virtues of Inconsistency,” Monist, 68 (1), 1985, 105-135.
- “Radical Interpretation and Global Scepticism” in Truth and Interpretation, Ernest LePore (ed.), Basil Blackwell, 1986, 369-386.
- “Immune Belief Systems,” Philosophical Topics, 14 (1), 1986, 259-280.
- “On Behalf of the Skeptic,” The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, S. Luper-Foy (ed.), Rowman & Littlefield, 1987, 267-281.
- “Epistemic Compatibilism and Canonical Beliefs,” in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism, M. Roth & G. Ross (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, 99-117.
- “Certainty” in A Companion to Epistemology, J. Dancy & E. Sosa (eds.), Basil Blackwell, 1992, 61-64.
- “Contemporary Scepticism” in A Companion to Epistemology, J. Dancy & E. Sosa (eds.), Basil Blackwell, 1992, 458-462.
- “Scepticism” in A Companion to Epistemology, J. Dancy & E. Sosa (eds.), Basil Blackwell, 1992, 457-8.
- “What Price Coherence?” (with Ted Warfield), Analysis, 54.3, July 1994, 129-32.
- “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails,” Philosophical Topics, 23.1, Spring 1995, 213-236.
- Reprinted in Huemer& Audi, eds., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, 2002.
- “Closure” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, R. Audi (ed.), 1995, 126-7. “Certainty” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, R. Audi (ed.), 1995, 113-4.
- “No Help for the Coherentist,” (with Ted Warfield) Analysis, 56.2, April 1996, 118-121.
- “Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility” in Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig, Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, 97-130.
- “Certainty” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, E. Craig (ed.), 1998, vol 2, 264-267.
- “The Concept of Knowledge” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, E. Craig (ed.), 1998, vol 5, 266-276.
- Reprinted in The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E, Craig (ed.), 2005, 524-32
- “Epistemology” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, E. Craig (ed.), 1998, vol 3, 362-365.
- Reprinted in The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E, Craig (ed.), 2005, 224-7.
- “Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58.4, 1998, 919-925.
- “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13, J. Tomberlin (ed.), 1999, 297-325.
- Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology (ed. E, Sosa, J. Kim, J Fantl, M. McGrath), 2nd edition, Blackwell Publishing, 2008, 165-185.
- “Why Not Infinitism?”in Epistemology: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress in Philosophy, Richard Cobb-Stevens (ed.), Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000, vol 5, 199-208.
- “Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism,” Philosophical Issues, 10, 2000, 108-116.
- Also appeared in Spanish in Teorema,19.3, 2000, 127-35
- “The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism,” Acta Analytica, 15.24, 2000, 7-24.
- “Skepticism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, October, 2001, and updated September, 2005. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/
- “Skepticism,” The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2002, 336-361.
- “How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Press, ed. Steven Luper, 2003, 75-94.
- Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology (ed. E, Sosa, J. Kim, J Fantl, M. McGrath), 2nd edition, Blackwell Publishing, 2008, 35-50.
- “Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism,” The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, ed. Erik Olsson, Kluwer, 2003, 281-297.
- “When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66.3, 2003, 718-729.
- “Knowledge is True, Non-defeated Justified Belief,” Essential Knowledge, Longman Publishers, ed. Steven Luper, 2004, 124-135.
- “There is No Good Reason to be an Academic Skeptic,” Essential Knowledge, Longman Publishers, ed. Steven Luper, 2004, 299-309.
- “What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68.1, 2004, 166-171.
- “Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?” in Ernest Sosa and his Critics, ed. John Greco, Blackwell Publishers, 2004, 112-125.
- “Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues, 14, 2004, 165-184.
- “Is Infinitism the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem?” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds), Blackwell Publishers, 2005, 131-40.
- “Reply to Ginet,” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, Blackwell Publishers, 2005, 149-52.
- “Infinitism’s Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism,” in special edition of Veritas entitled Perspectives in Contemporary Epistemology, 50.4, December 2005, 153-172.
- “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning,” Philosophical Studies, 134. 1, 2007, 1-17.
- Translated and reprinted : “El conocimiento humano y el progreso infinito del razonamiento.” Signos Filosoficos, 10.19, 2008, 175-204.
- “How to be an Infinitist about Doxastic Justification,” Philosophical Studies, 134.1, 2007, 25-29.
- “Contemporary Responses to Agrippa’s Trilemma,” The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, ed. John Greco, Oxford University Press, 2008, 484-503.
- “Useful False Beliefs,” Epistemology: New Essays. Quentin Smith (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2008, 25-61.
- “Self-Profile, ” Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, Mathias Steup (ed.), 10 ms pages, forthcoming.
- “Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem,” Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Sven Bernecker (ed), forthcoming, 30 ms.
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