Brian Loar

Brian Loar
Professor II

Contact Information
Office: Seminary 1
Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Phone: (732) 932-9861
Ph.D., Oxford University
Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics
Research and Professional Activities
Phenomenal intentionality, concepts, and the physical status of consciousness.
  • "Reference and Propositional Attitudes", The Philosophical Review, vol LXXXI, no.1 - January 1972, 43-62
  • "Two Theories of Meaning", in Truth and Meaning, ed Evans and McDowell, Oxford University Press, 1976, 138-161
  • "The Semantics of Singular Terms", Philosophical Studies 30 (1976) 353-377
  • "Ramsey's theory of belief and truth", in Prospects for Pragmatism, D.H. Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1980, 49-70
  • "Names and Descriptions" in Philosophical Studies, 38 (1980), 85-89
  • Mind and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp xi + 268.
  • "Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol 23, No 3, July 1982, 272-283
  • "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?", PSA 1982, vol 2, 627-643
  • "Truth beyond All Verification", in Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, Barry Taylor (ed.), 81-116, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
  • "Names in Thought", Philosophical Studies, 51 (1987) 169-185.
  • "Subjective Intentionality", Philosophical Topics, Spring 1987, 89-124.
  • "Social Content and Psychological Content", in Thought and Content, Robert Grimm and Daniel Merrill (eds.), University of Arizona Press, 1988, pp 99-110.
    -Reprinted in The Nature of Mind, ed David M. Rosenthal, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp 568-575.
    -Reprinted in The Twin-Earth Chronicles, ed. Pessin et al.
  • "A New Kind of Content", in Grimm and Merrill. op. cit.,121-139.
  • "Phenomenal States", Philosophical Perspectives, vol 4, 1990, pp 81-108.
  • "Personal References", in Information, Semantics and Epistemology, ed. Enrique Villanueva, Blackwell, 1991
  • "Can We Explain Intentionality?", in Meaning in Mind, 1991, pp 119-136. ed. Georges Rey and Barry Loewer, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
  • "Elimination vs Nonreductive Physicalism", in Reductionism, Explanation and Realism, ed David Charles and Kathleen Lennon, OUP. 1993
  • "Self-interpretation and the Constitution of Reference", Philosophical Perspectives 8, February 1994, pp 51-74.
  • "Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties?", Philosophical Issues, 1995.
  • "Meaning", Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995.
  • "Reference from the First-Person Perspective", Philosophical Issues 1995
  • "Phenomenal States: Second Version", in Consciousness, ed Block, Flanagan, Guzeldier, MIT Press, 1997.
    -Reprinted in Philosophy of Mind, ed David J. Chalmers, Oxford
    -Reprinted in "There's Something about Mary", eds Ludlow, Nagasawa, Stoljar, MIT Press, forthcoming.
  • "Does literal meaning supervene on speaker's meaning?", Paul Grice's Heritage, ed Giovanna Cosenza, 2001
  • "Should the explanatory gap perplex us?", Proceedings of the World Congress of Philosophy, 2000
  • "Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content", in Hahn and Ramberg ed Reflections and Replies, MIT/Bradford Books, forthcoming 2003.
  • "Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia ", forthcoming in Consciousness, Smith and Jokic eds., Oxford University Press, 2002


Upcoming Events

Thu, Mar 23, 2023 3:00 pm-05:00 pm
Rutgers Climate Lecture: Julie Walsh (Wellesley)
Thu, Mar 30, 2023 4:30 pm-06:30 pm
Prof. Jeffery Long (Elizabethtown College)
Thu, Apr 6, 2023 3:00 pm-05:00 pm
Faculty Meeting
Fri, Apr 7, 2023 3:00 pm-05:00 pm
Prof. Cailin O'Connor (UC, Irvine)

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