Brian Loar

Brian Loar
Professor II

Contact Information
Office: Seminary 1
Phone: (732) 932-9861
Ph.D., Oxford University
Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics
Research and Professional Activities
Phenomenal intentionality, concepts, and the physical status of consciousness.
  • "Reference and Propositional Attitudes", The Philosophical Review, vol LXXXI, no.1 - January 1972, 43-62
  • "Two Theories of Meaning", in Truth and Meaning, ed Evans and McDowell, Oxford University Press, 1976, 138-161
  • "The Semantics of Singular Terms", Philosophical Studies 30 (1976) 353-377
  • "Ramsey's theory of belief and truth", in Prospects for Pragmatism, D.H. Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1980, 49-70
  • "Names and Descriptions" in Philosophical Studies, 38 (1980), 85-89
  • Mind and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp xi + 268.
  • "Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol 23, No 3, July 1982, 272-283
  • "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?", PSA 1982, vol 2, 627-643
  • "Truth beyond All Verification", in Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, Barry Taylor (ed.), 81-116, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
  • "Names in Thought", Philosophical Studies, 51 (1987) 169-185.
  • "Subjective Intentionality", Philosophical Topics, Spring 1987, 89-124.
  • "Social Content and Psychological Content", in Thought and Content, Robert Grimm and Daniel Merrill (eds.), University of Arizona Press, 1988, pp 99-110.
    -Reprinted in The Nature of Mind, ed David M. Rosenthal, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp 568-575.
    -Reprinted in The Twin-Earth Chronicles, ed. Pessin et al.
  • "A New Kind of Content", in Grimm and Merrill. op. cit.,121-139.
  • "Phenomenal States", Philosophical Perspectives, vol 4, 1990, pp 81-108.
  • "Personal References", in Information, Semantics and Epistemology, ed. Enrique Villanueva, Blackwell, 1991
  • "Can We Explain Intentionality?", in Meaning in Mind, 1991, pp 119-136. ed. Georges Rey and Barry Loewer, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
  • "Elimination vs Nonreductive Physicalism", in Reductionism, Explanation and Realism, ed David Charles and Kathleen Lennon, OUP. 1993
  • "Self-interpretation and the Constitution of Reference", Philosophical Perspectives 8, February 1994, pp 51-74.
  • "Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties?", Philosophical Issues, 1995.
  • "Meaning", Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995.
  • "Reference from the First-Person Perspective", Philosophical Issues 1995
  • "Phenomenal States: Second Version", in Consciousness, ed Block, Flanagan, Guzeldier, MIT Press, 1997.
    -Reprinted in Philosophy of Mind, ed David J. Chalmers, Oxford
    -Reprinted in "There's Something about Mary", eds Ludlow, Nagasawa, Stoljar, MIT Press, forthcoming.
  • "Does literal meaning supervene on speaker's meaning?", Paul Grice's Heritage, ed Giovanna Cosenza, 2001
  • "Should the explanatory gap perplex us?", Proceedings of the World Congress of Philosophy, 2000
  • "Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content", in Hahn and Ramberg ed Reflections and Replies, MIT/Bradford Books, forthcoming 2003.
  • "Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia ", forthcoming in Consciousness, Smith and Jokic eds., Oxford University Press, 2002


Recent News

  • Rutgers Students Learn the Art of Argument

    Students in Justin Kalef’s “Logic, Reason, and Persuasion” class at Rutgers University take a deep dive into some divisive issues. And they can expect, over the course of the semester, to have their positions challenged—perhaps by the person sitting next to them. Kalef, a teaching professor in the Department of Philosophy, School of Arts and Sciences, gets this undergraduate course underway by surveying students on such topical hot buttons as abortion, gun control, and tax policy. “Then I put them on...


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