Faculty Book Page

Recent Books



Marilyn McCord Adams:

  • Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham (Oxford University Press, 2010).

Andy Egan:

  • Epistemic Modality (ed. with Brian Weatherson; Oxford University Press, 2011).

Jerry Fodor:

  • LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited (Oxford University Press, 2008).
  • What Darwin Got Wrong (with Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini; Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 2010).

Alvin Goldman:

  • Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman  (Gerhard Schurz and Markus Werning, eds.; Rodopi Press, 2009).
  • Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2012).
  • Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition (Oxford University Press, 2013).
  • Social Epistemology: Essential Readings (ed. with Dennis Whitcomb; Oxford University Press, 2011).
  • Goldman & His Critics (eds. Brian McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith; Wiley-Blackwell, 2016).

Douglas Husak:

  • The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 2010).
  • Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry (Oxford University Press, 2016).

Jeffrey King:

  • New Thinking About Structured Propositions (with Scott Soames and Jeff Speaks), Oxford University Press, 2013.

Peter Kivy:

  • Once-Told Tales: An Essay in Literary Aesthetics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011)
  • Sounding Off: Eleven Essays in the Philosophy of Music (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Peter Klein

  • Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism (co-edited with John Turri), Oxford University Press, 2014.

Ernie Lepore:

  • Philosophy and Poetry: Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume 33 (ed. with Peter French and Howard Wettstein; Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
  • Meaning, Mind, and Matter: Philosophical Essays (with Barry Loewer; Oxford University Press, 2011).

Barry Loewer:

  • Meaning, Mind, and Matter: Philosophical Essays (with Ernie Lepore; Oxford University Press, 2011).
  • Why There Is Anything Except Physics (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Robert Matthews:

  • The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution (Oxford University Press, paperback 2010)

Howard McGary Jr.:

  • The Post-Racial Ideal (Marquette University Press, 2012).

Brian McLaughlin:

  • The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2009).

Ted Sider:

  • Writing the Book of the World (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Ernest Sosa:

  • Reflective Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2009).
  • Knowing Full Well (Princeton University Press, 2011).

Stephen Stich:

  • Stich and His Critics (Dominic Murphy and Michael Bishop, eds.; Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
  • The Moral Psychology Handbook (John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group, eds.; Oxford University Press, 2010).
  • Mind and Language: Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2011).
  • Knowledge, Rationality and Morality: Collected Papers, Vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2012).
  • The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, (ed. with Eric Margolis and Richard Samuels; Oxford University Press, 2012).

Larry Temkin:

  • Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning.  (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Dean Zimmerman:

  • Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (ed. with Ted Sider and John Hawthorne; Blackwell, 2008).
  • God in an Open Universe:  Science, Metaphysics, and Open Theism (ed. with William Hasker and Thomas Jay Oord); Pickwick Publications, 2011).

Matt Walker Abstract

Friends, Utility, and Final Value: A Problem in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9

Matthew Walker (Rutgers University)

On the one hand, Aristotle maintains that perfect friends are choiceworthy (and loveable) for their own sake, and not for the sake of further ends. On the other hand, in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9, Aristotle appears somehow to account for the choiceworthiness of friends by reference to their utility as sources of an agent’s self-awareness. I examine Aristotle’s views on the choiceworthiness of friends for their own sake (i.e., their final value), and offer a resolution of some of the apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle’s account.

Adina Roskies Abstract

Abstract: The brain sciences are providing new means of investigating brain processes involved in decision making. However, our ability to understand decision-making at the computational level requires methods unsuitable for use in humans. Here I argue that monkeys are attractive models of human decision-making, and that neurophysiological recordings in monkeys can provide insight into human decision processes. I explore a number of objections to the relevance of monkey data to understanding human decision-making, including the importance of language and consciousness, and argue that none undermines the applicability of the model, though some may limit it. Finally, I'll briefly address the relevance of studies of decision in monkeys to questions of free will.

David Papineau Talk

David Papineau – April 4, 2011

Title:  Can We Really See a Million Colours


Many philosophers take it to be uncontroversial that visual perception can represent something like a million different colours (and then they debate whether this shows that some mental representation is non-conceptual).  I defend the contrary thesis that visual perception only represents a few different colours (along with being able to represent that adjacent surfaces are different-in-colour).  This may be counteruintuitive but it accommodates the empirical data better than the standard view and also resolves various philosophical puzzles.