HISTORY OF METAPHYSCIS; PRIMARY AND SECONDAY QUALITIES  
730:314, FALL SEMSETER, 2020

SYLLABUS

INSTRUCTOR: Martha Bolton  
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Office hours: W 4:30-5:30 pm; other times by appointment--in CHAT on course Canvas site.

READINGS: All readings will be available on the course Canvas site (click on ‘Files’) or from on-line sources given with the assignment.

REQUIREMENTS: 1. Students are expected to come to the Zoom meetings at the time set aside for this course: MW 1:10-2:30 pm (EST). If you expect to miss one or two classes, you may use the electronic absence reporting form: <https://sims.rutgers.edu/ssra/>. An email will automatically be sent to me. When you join a class meeting, you should have read the scheduled assignment at least once.   
2. Students are required to write two papers: *a short paper (1500-2000 words) and a long final paper* *due at the end of the semester ( 5600-6750 words).*   
3. Students are required to answer a short question in Discussions on the course Canvas site and to make a substantive comment on the answer given by one other member of the class. There will typically be a question each week. Posts will be graded..

LEARNING GOALS: A good understanding of the distinction of primary and secondary qualities abroad in western philosophy from ancient times to the present, its varieties, reasons for and against them, and more general philosophical issues at stake. Enhanced ability to comprehend competing sides of an issue, analyze the assumptions and implications of claims, and assess reasons offered for and against claims. Increased ability to sustain an argument in support of a philosophical position.

SCHEDULE

Sept. 2 Introduction

8 and 9 Ancient Greek antecedents   
Democritus fragments (ed. C. C. Taylor); The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus*,*Commentary, pp. 171-79   
Mi-Kyoung Lee, ‘The Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities in Ancient Greek Philosophy’

14 Aristotle, *De Anima*, 2.6

16 Scholastics on sensible qualities  
Robert Passnau, ‘Scholastic Qualities, Primary and Secondary’

21 Galileo Galilei: argument for a significant metaphysical difference of P and SQs   
T*he Assayer* (1623), trans Stillman Drake, pp. 23-35. <https://web.stanford.edu/~jsabol/certainty/readings/Galileo-Assayer.pdf>   
Julio Martinez, ‘Galileo on primary and secondary qualities’, *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 10 (1974), 160-69.\*  
[\*Asterisks mark articles in journals which are archived on the RU Libraries website. On the ‘Quick Search’ page, click ‘Journals’ in bar at left, search for the journal you want; click ‘view on line’; if needed, click ‘browse’ to access the archive; find issue and article you want by year and page numbers.]

23 Rene Descartes: reason to deny that SQs as we experience them belong in bodies  
*Meditations* (1641), 2 and 5 (mpp 29-34, 63-6); *Principles of Philosophy* (1644) (abr ‘PP’), Pt 1, 60-71 (mpp 28-37 )and Pt 4, 190-99 (mpp 316-324 ); *The World* (1629), chs 1-2 (mpp 3-10)  
Lisa Downing, ‘Sensible Qualities and Material Bodies in Descartes and Boyle’, pp. 109-128

28 \_\_\_\_\_\_: and SQs are modes of bodies--inconsistency? ambiguity? duality?   
*Treatise on Man* (1629), mpp 119-202; *Optics* (1637), Disc 1 and 6 (mpp 81-93 and 114-146); PP 4.188-99 (mpp. 15-323); Letter to Chanut, 26 Feb. 1649; CSM 3.168-9   
Margaret Atherton, ‘Green is Like Bread: The Nature of Descartes’ Account of Color Perception’

30 same

Oct. 5 \_\_\_\_\_\_: are ideas of SQs intrinsically representational?  
*The World*, ch 1-2 (CSM 1, 81-84); *Meditation* 3, mpp 25-44; *Fourth Objections*, mpp 206-7 and *Replies*, mpp. 231-235   
Gary Hatfield, ‘Descartes on sensory representation, objective reality, and material falsity’

7 \_\_\_\_\_\_: what is the difference between P and SQs?   
*Meditation* 6, mpp 78-83   
Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience,"  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(3), 549-579, Introduction and parts I-III, pp. 549-559

12 Robert Boyle: reason to deny that SQs belong to bodies   
Robert Boyle, *The Origin of Forms and Qualities* (1666)*,* pp. 18-37; *About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis* (1674), Recapitulation, pp, 152-4.  
Lisa Downing, ‘Sensible Qualities and Material Bodies in Descartes and Boyle’, pp. 128-34

19 \_\_\_\_\_\_: qualities in general; would bodies have SQs if there were no perceivers?  
Peter Anstey, *Philosophy of Robert Boyle,* Pt 1, ch 4, pp. 86-12. E-book available from RU Library website. Click ‘Contents’ and find assigned chapter.

21 John Locke: *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690), Bk 2, ch 8—distinction of P and SQs; *Essay*, I.1; 2.23.1-8 and 22-31; 4.3,10-16 and 25-29; 4.12.12-13—attitude toward mechanist hypothesis, conception of qualities in general, sorts of powers   
Edwin Curley, ‘Locke, Boyle, and the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities’, *Philosophical Review* 81 (1972), 438-64\*

26 \_\_\_\_\_\_: experiential and physical components of the doctrine of qualities  
M. R. Ayers, ‘Primary and Secondary Qualities in Locke’s *Essay*’

28 \_\_\_\_\_\_: resemblance thesis; ‘real’ and ‘imputed’ qualities  
*Essay*, Bk 2, ch 1, secs 1-8; 2-7; Bk 2, ch 30, sec, 2, ch 31, secs. 1-2, ch 32, secs 13-16--basis for the representative function of simple ideas of sensation: Essay, Bk 2, ch 9, secs 8-10  
Robert Wilson, ‘Primary and Secondary Qualities’   
  
Nov. 2 same  
**Short paper due at 11:59 pm**

4 A.D. Smith, ‘Of Primary and Secondary Qualities’, (1990) *Philosophical Review*, 99, 221-54\*-- defense of ‘the’ 17th century distinction of P and SQs

9 George Berkeley. *Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710) (abr, ‘PHK’), Introduction—against abstract ideas, against P/SQ distinction;  
PHK secs 1-15—sensible qualities in general are ideas; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues,* mpp 171-195 and 201-02—inseparability of P and SQs and Idealism   
Samuel Rickless, *Berkeley’s Argument for Idealism*, 148-165 and 185-8

16 Joshua Gert, ‘Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values’ *Philosophical Topics* (2010), 87-105\* --SQs and evaluative attributes: dependent on human responses?

18 Jonathan Cohen, ‘Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: a Relationalist Manifesto’, *Philosophical Review* (2004), 451-506;  
Edward Wilson Averill and Allan Hazelitt, ‘A Problem for Relational Theories of Color’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2010), 140-145

23 same

25 Marc Johnston, ‘Speaking of the Colors’, *Philosophical Studies*, 68 (1992), 221-63\*—dispositional account of SQs

30 same

Dec. 2 Barry Maund. ‘Color Eliminativism’

7 same

9 TBA

**Final paper due at 11:59 pm on day of regularly scheduled exam for this class period.**

ACADEMIC POLICY:

Academic integrity is taken very seriously in this course. Violations include: cheating, plagiarism, fabrication, denying others access to facilities or information, and facilitating violations of academic integrity. For the current University academic integrity policy, go to <http://academicintegrity.rutgers.edu/academic-integrity-policy/> Ask the instructor if you have questions about how this policy affects your work for this course.

Constructive discussion:

Productive intellectual inquiry—the basic purpose of colleges and universities—requires respectful and constructive discussion that enables all parties to participate fully. Philosophy has an especially vital role to play in facilitating such inquiry, because philosophers have been developing and honing practices of critical discussion over many centuries: techniques for uncovering, justifying, and assessing assumptions behind any claim, from the most obvious to the most controversial.

Philosophy is thus a valuable tool for self-reflection and for communal debate.  But like any tool, in order to work, it must be used well.  In class, online, and at talks or meetings, we expect all participants to observe basic norms of civility and respect.  This means stating your own views directly and substantively: focusing on reasons, assumptions and consequences rather than on who is offering them, or how.  And  it means engaging others’ views in the same terms.  No topic or claim is too obvious or controversial to be discussed; but claims and opinions have a place in the discussion only when they are presented in a respectful, collegial, and constructive way.

Students with disabilities requesting accommodations must follow the procedures outlined at <https://ods.rutgers.edu/students/registration-form>.