01 (D. Sorensen) In this course, we will survey historical and contemporary debates about the proper aims of scientific inquiry and its (potential) limitations. Scientific realists argue that we are justified in accepting what our best scientific theories tell us about the world. So, we are justified in believing in the theoretical entities (both observable and unobservable), properties, and laws posited by our best (current) theories and realists are optimistic that, in the long run, science will give us an even more accurate picture of reality. Anti-realists reject one or more of these assumptions. We will begin by studying several anti-realist alternatives, including: Neo-Kantianism, positivism, constructive empiricism, relativism, and social constructionism. We will then examine several challenges to scientific realism, such as the argument from pessimistic meta-induction, underdetermination of theory by data, and skepticism about abduction. To close off the semester, we will look at several applications of the realist/anti-realist debate in fundamental physics and in the special sciences (e.g. primordial cosmology, paleontology, and cognitive science).
Here are some of the questions that we will raise and try to answer: